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Abstract
This paper examines the framework and cooperation mechanisms set up by Regulation (EU) 
2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a frame-
work for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The Regulation merely gives 
a framework for the coordination of national legislation, and member states can still decide if they 
want to set up screening mechanisms and to screen foreign direct investments. The pandemic 
has accelerated these processes, and more and more European Union member states enacted 
legislation relating to the screening of foreign direct investments in strategic branches of the econ-
omy. The Commission has also issued a Guidance at the end of March 2020, in which it warns 
about the risk that the Coronavirus related economic shock might have on strategic industries, es-
pecially on healthcare related industries. At the same time, recognizing the importance of foreign 
direct investments for the economy, it pointed out in the Guidance the necessity to find a balance 
between the need for foreign capital and the protection of European Union strategic industries 
using appropriate screening tools.
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Absztrakt
A tanulmány az Európai Unióba irányuló közvetlen külföldi befektetések átvilágítási keretének lét-
rehozásáról szóló 2019. március 19-i (EU) 2019/452 európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet által 
létrehozott keretet és együttműködési mechanizmust vizsgálja. A Rendelet csak keretrendszert 
határoz meg a nemzeti szabályozás koordinálása céljából, a tagállamok szabadon eldönthetik, 
hogy fel kívánnak-e állítani a közvetlen külföldi befektetések kapcsán átvilágítási mechanizmuso-
kat. A pandémia azonban felgyorsította ezeket a folyamatokat, és egyre több Európai Uniós tag-
ország hozott a külföldi közvetlen befektetések átvilágításával kapcsolatos jogszabályokat straté-
giai jelentőségű gazdasági szektorokban. A Bizottság szintén kiadott egy Bizottsági Iránymutatást 












hatására a stratégiai ágazatokban, főleg az egészségügyi ellátással kapcsolatos ágazatokban. 
Ugyanakkor, felismerve a közvetlen külföldi befektetések jelentőségét a gazdaság számára, ki-
emeli az Iránymutatásban, hogy meg kell találni az egyensúlyt a külföldi tőke szükségessége és 
az Európai Uniós stratégiai iparágak védelme között a megfelelő átvilágítási eszközök felhasz-
nálásával.
Kulcsszavak: Európai Unió, közvetlen külföldi befektetés, átvilágítás, 2019/452 EU rendelet
The days of a unipolar global system that emerged during the end of the 20th 
Century are slowly coming to an end. Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the 
economic and political dominance of the United States has been fading. The 2008 
World Economic Crisis greatly accelerated this process. With the weakening of the 
United States we have been facing a process of global isolation and protectionism. 
The same can be observed in relation to the World Trade Organization negotiations. 
Protectionism is spreading,1 and not only with regards to international trade, but also 
the freedom of international investments is becoming more and more restricted. 
The European Union also reacted to this tendency last year, and with a bit of irony 
we might say that it is never too late, and thus it passed Regulation (EU) 2019/452 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019, establishing a 
framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (hereinafter: 
Regulation).2 The Regulation is applicable from October 11, 2020.3 The pandemic 
has accelerated these processes, and more and more European Union member 
states have enacted legislation related to the screening of foreign investments in 
strategic branches of the economy. The Commission issued a Guidance at end of 
March 2020, in which it warns about the risk that the coronavirus related economic 
shock might have on strategic industries, especially on healthcare related industries. 
At the same time, recognizing the importance of foreign direct investments for the 
economy, it points out in the Guidance the necessity to find a balance between the 
need for foreign capital and the protection of European Union strategic industries.4 
 1 See Csongor István Nagy, ’World Trade, Imperial Fantasies and Protectionism: Can You Really Have Your 
Cake and Eat It Too?’ (2019) 26(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 87–132. <https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=3363951> accessed 28 July 2020 (doi.org/10.2979/indjglolegstu.26.1.0087).
 2 OJ L 079I 21.3.2019, p. 1. The Regulation has been amended by the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2020/1298 of 13 July 2020 amending the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (OJ L 304, 
18.9.2020, p. 1–3). The consolidate version of the Regulation can be found at the following link: <https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02019R0452-20200919> accessed 20 May 2021. There are 
several works on the issue of screening of foreign direct investments in the EU, see e.g.: Cees Verburg, ‘The 
Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the European Union: Regulation 2019/452 and Its Implications 
for Energy Investments’ (2019) 13 European Energy Law Report 219–244; Giani Pandey, Davide Rovetta, 
Agnieszka Smiatacz, ‘How Many Barriers Should a Steeple Chase Have: Will the EU’s Proposed Regulation on 
Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Add yet More Delaying Barriers When Getting a Merger Deal through 
the Clearance Gate, and Other Considerations’ (2019) 14(2) Global Trade and Customs Journal 56–65.
 3 Regulation, Art 17.
 4 Article 63(1) of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Official 
Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390) provides as a general rule that: “all restrictions on the movement 
of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.”
11
Pro Futuro 2020/4
The Regulation of Screening of Foreign Direct Investments in the European Union
For this, appropriate screening tools are needed according to the Commission. 
Therefore, it encourages member states which have a screening mechanism to use 
it, and those without it to introduce one.5
The examination of the Regulation in Europe is timely for several reasons. There 
is obviously a realignment on the international economic scene, and several re-
searchers forecast the twilight of liberal capitalism.6 Countries are becoming more 
restrictive in this area and trying to protect crucial sectors in their economies. At the 
same time, national economies worldwide still need foreign working capital, and it is 
still crucial for every modern economy, especially in hard times. The European Union 
tried to be open in this regard, but it seems that there is no reciprocity among large 
players.7 Reforms in China have slowed down, while it seems that the United States 
is moving towards protectionism.8 It also seems that there will be strong economic 
and military competition between China and the United States in the future, at the 
same time, the world economy will remain highly interdependent.
1. Providing a framework for screening
The Regulation, as its full title states, merely provides a framework for the coor-
dination of national legislation, and member states still have the responsibility to set 
up screening mechanisms and to screen foreign direct investments. At the same 
time, in the European Union, being a single market, coordination of policies related 
 5 Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment and free movement of capital from 
third countries, and the protection of Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU) 
2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158676.
pdf> accessed 24 July 2020.
 6 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Neoliberalism must be pronounced dead and buried. Where next?’ The Guardian (30 May 
2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/may/30/neoliberalism-must-be-pronouced-dead-and-
buried-where-next> accessed 26 November 2020; Joseph Stiglitz, People, Power, and Profits: Progressive 
Capitalism for an Age of Discontent (W. W. Norton and Company 2019) 8; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to 
Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’ (2019) 43(4) International Security <https://doi.
org/10.1162/isec_a_00342> accessed 14 July 2020.
 7 European Commission, ‘Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation’ 15 <https://ec.europa.eu/commis-
sion/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-globalisation_en.pdf> accessed 22 July 2020.
 8 This process has already started after the economic crisis of 2008, intensified during Trump’s presidency, 
and until now there is no substantial change (only general promises) in President Biden’s attitude towards 
issues like the WTO DSB blockage, the Trans-Pacific Agreement (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP), or towards the improvement of economic relationship with China. See e.g. 
‘US and China trade angry words at high-level Alaska talks’ BBC (19 March 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-56452471> accessed 17 May 2021; ‘US and China publicly rebuke each other in first 
major talks of Biden era’ The Guardian (19 March 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/19/
us-china-talks-alaska-biden-blinken-sullivan-wang> accessed 17 May 2021; See also: Soli Özel ‘US Isola-
tionism: How to Step Back Without Stepping Away? Interview with Charles Kupchan’ Institut Montaigne (12 
January 2021) <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/us-isolationism-how-step-back-without-stepping-
away> accessed 17 May 2021. In addition, the robust US screening mechanism is also a good example for 
moving towards a more closed economy. See Jason Jacobs, ‘Tiptoeing the Line Between National Security 
and Protectionism: A Comparative Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Screening in the United States and 












to the regulation of foreign direct investments is definitely needed. As in many other 
cases, the recital of the Regulation contains lot of useful information, and we can 
learn the reasons for the adoption of the legal act, the purpose of the act and so on.9 
First of all, the recital explains the legal bases for the enactment of the Regulation, 
referring to article 3(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
states that “The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: … 
(e) common commercial policy”, and foreign direct investment falls within this field.10 
Furthermore, article 3(5) of Treaty on European Union states that “In its relations 
with the wider world, the Union shall … contribute to the protection of its citizens.”11 
This is legitimate even under international treaties like the agreement establishing 
the World Trade Organisation or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, because it is done on the grounds of security or public order.12 At the 
same time, as such foreign direct investments might affect national security (this is 
actually, the reason for regulating this field), and article 4 (2) of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union states that “national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State”, the recital emphasizes that the Regulation is only a common frame-
work coordinating this issue, and member states can decide if they want to set up a 
screening mechanism at all.13 Currently, 18 member states have legislation related 
to screening of foreign direct investments:
 9 Thomson Reuters Practical Law Glossary <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-009-6368?transiti
onType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> accessed 22 July 2020. Some authors 
claim that the purpose of recitals is to set out concise reasons for the chief provisions of the enacting terms. 
However, recitals have no legal value, and they cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual 
provisions of the act in question. Recitals have no independent operative effect under EU law. At the same 
time, recitals are often used in interpretation by the courts, and operative provision are often interpreted in 
light of the recital. Tadas Klimas, Jflrate Vaitiukait, ‘The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation’ 
(2008) 15(1) ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 67, 76, 85 <https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1643&context=ilsajournal> accessed 23 July 2020.
 10 Recital 6. See also article 207 (1) of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Europe-
an Union (Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390), which provides that: “The common commercial 
policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to … foreign direct investment…”
 11 Regulation, rec. 2.
 12 Regulation, rec. 3. Csongor István Nagy, ‘Free Trade, Public Interest and Reality: New Generation Free 
Trade Agreements and National Regulatory Sovereignty’ (2018) 9 Czech Yearbook of International Law 199–
203 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172064> accessed 28 July 2020; Csongor István Nagy, ‘Clash of Trade and 
National Public Interest in WTO Law: The Illusion of ‘Weighing and Balancing’ and the Theory of Reserva-
tion’ (2020) 23(1) Journal of International Economic Law 143–163 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572398> ac-
cessed 28 July 2020 (doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgz028).
 13 Regulation, rec. 8.
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Table 1. Legislation relating to screening of foreign direct investments  
in member states14
Member state Legal act
Austria
Foreign Commerce Act of 2011 (Section 25a)
Austrian Investment Control Act / ICA, in force since 25 July 2020 except for 
those provisions destined to enter into force by 11 October 2020
Czech Republic Act No. 34/2021 on screening of foreign direct investments
Denmark
Act on War Material (The Danish Consolidated Act No. 1004 of October 22 
2012)
Act on the continental shelf and certain pipelines installations on territorial 
waters (The Danish Consolidated Act No. 1189 of September 21 2018)
Germany
Foreign Trade and Payments Act [of 6 June 2013 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 
1482), as last amended on 18 June 2020]
Article 4, 5, 13 and 15
Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance [of 2 August 2013 (Federal Law 
Gazette [BGBl.] Part I p. 2865), as last amended on n 29 October 2020]
Article 55 to 62
Finland
Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions (172/2012)
Act on transfers of real estate property requiring special permission (470/2019)
Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions (172/2020, amend-
ments 2.10.2020/682)
France
Financial and monetary code, Legal section, Book I, Title V : Financial deal-
ings with foreign countries, Articles L.151-1 to L.151-7
Financial and monetary code, Infra-legal section, Book I, Title V : Financial 
dealings with foreign countries, Chapter I : Investments subject to authoriza-
tion, Articles R.151-1 to R.151-18
Order of 31 December 2019 relating to foreign investments in France
French Commercial Code, Article L.233-3, Article L.430-1, Article 459 of the 
Customs code (penal sanctions)
Hungary
Act LVII of 2018 on Controlling Foreign Investments Violating Hungary’s 
Security Interests15
Government Decree 246/2018. (XII. 17.) on the Implementation of Act LVII 
of 2018 on Controlling Foreign Investments Violating Hungary’s Security 
Interests
Act No. LVIII of 2020 on the Transitional Rules related to the End of the State 
of Danger and Pandemic Preparedness (section 85. Paragraphs 276–292)
Government Decree 289/2020 (VI. 17.) defining the measures required for 
the economic protection of companies having their seats in Hungary
 14 Source: List of screening mechanisms notified by Member States (28 July 2020) <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157946.pdf> accessed 17 May 2021.
 15 On the analyses of the law see: Szilárd Gáspár Szilágyi, ‘Country Report on Hungary and Romania’ in Hin-
delang and Moberg (eds.), A Common European Law on Investment Screening (Springer 2020) <https://ssrn.












Member state Legal act
Italy
Decree law 15 March 2012, nr. 21 “Rules on special powers on corporate 
assets in the defense and national security sectors, as well as for activities 
of strategic importance in the energy, transport and communications sectors”
Amendments to the regulation on special powers in sectors of strategic im-
portance set forth in Articles 3 and 4-bis of the decree-law 21 September 
2019, n. 105, converted with amendments by law November 18, 2019, n. 
133
Decree-Law 8 April 2020, n. 23. “Urgent measures regarding access to credit 
and tax obligations for businesses, special powers in strategic sectors, as 
well as interventions in the field of health and labour, extension of adminis-
trative and procedural terms.” Art. 15-16
Decree of the President of the Republic 19 February 2014, nr. 35 “Regula-
tion for the identification of procedures for the activation of special powers in 
the fields of defense and national security, pursuant to article 1, paragraph 
8, of the decree-law 15 March 2012, nr. 21”
Decree of the President of the Republic 25 March 2014, nr. 86 “Regulation 
for the identification of procedures for the activation of special powers in the 
energy, transport and communications sectors, pursuant to article 2, para-
graph 9, of the decree-law 15 March 2012, nr. 21
Decree of the President of the Republic 25 March 2014, nr. 85 “Regulation 
for the identification of strategically important assets in the energy, transport 
and communications sectors, pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1, of Decree-
Law 15 March 2012, nr. 21”
Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers 6 June 2014, nr. 108 
“Regulation for the identification of activities of strategic importance for the 
national defense and security system, pursuant to article 1, paragraph 1, of 
the decree-law 15 March 2012, nr. 21”
Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers 6 August 2014 “Identi-
fication of the organizational and procedural methods for carrying out the 
activities preparatory to the exercise of special powers”
Article 10 ter of Law 176 of 18 December 2020, that converted into law 
Decree-Law 137 of 28 October 2020 Decree of the President of the Council 
of Ministers 179 of 18 December 2020 Decree of the President of the Coun-
cil of Ministers 180 of 23 December 2020
Latvia
National Security Law, Chapter VI – Restrictions on Commercial Companies 
of Significance to National Security
Regulation No. 606 adopted on 3 October 2017 regarding the Information to 
be Submitted to the Authority Determined in the National Security Law and 
the Handling of Information on Foreign Direct Investments (6 October 2020)
Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers of October 3, 2017 No. 606 “Regula-
tions regarding the information to be submitted to the institution specified in 
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Member state Legal act
Lithuania
The Law on Protection of Objects Important to Ensuring National Security 
of the Republic of Lithuania, No. IX-1132 (new edition No. XIII992 dated 
2018-01-12)
Resolution on the Rules of Procedure of the Commission approved by the 
Government, No. 1540 (new edition No. 266 dated 21-03-2018)
Resolution on the Determination of the Protection Zones of Importance to 
National Security approved by the Government, No. 1252 (new edition No. 
746 dated 25-07-2018) The Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance 
to Ensuring National Security, No. XIII-3257
Resolution of the Government No 1072, concerning the appointment of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania to perform functions
Resolution on the Rules of Procedure of the Commission for Coordination of 
Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security approved 
by the Government, No. 1540 (new edition No. 1213 Valid from Nov 4, 2020)
Malta ACT No. LX of 2020 of 18 December 2020 11
The Netherlands
Electricity Act 1998 (Article 86f)
Ministerial Regulation regarding the notification of change of control Elec-
tricity Act 1998 and Gas Act
Gas Act (Article 66e)
Ministerial Regulation regarding the notification of change of control Elec-
tricity Act 1998 and Gas Act
Telecommunications Act (Chapter 14a) 
Ministerial Decree regarding unwanted control telecommunication
Poland
Act of July 24, 2015 on the control of certain investments
Act of 19 June 2020 on Subsidies on Interest on Bank Loans Granted to 
Entrepreneurs Affected by COVID-19 and on the Simplified Procedure for 
the Approval of Arrangements in Connection with COVID-19
Portugal Decree-Law nº. 138/2014, of 15 September, published in the DR nº 177, series I, from 15.09.2014
Romania Law of competition 21 of April 10th 1996 Republished and amendedArt. 47 (9)-(12)
Slovak Republic Act No. 45/2011 Coll. on Critical Infrastructure as amended












Member state Legal act
Spain
Royal Decree 137/1993, which approves the regulation on weapons.
Royal Decree 664/99, on foreign investment Law 19/2003, on the legal sys-
tem on transfers of capitals and foreign economic transactions and specific 
measures for the prevention of money laundering
Royal Decree-Law 8/2020, on urgent extraordinary measures to address 
the economic and social impact of COVID-19, Final disposition 4
Royal Decree-Law 11/2020, of March 31, adopting urgent additional mea-
sures in the social and economic sphere to confront COVID19, Transitional 
disposition 2, Final disposition 3
Law 7/2010, General Law on audiovisual Communication
Royal Decree-Law 34/2020, of 17 November, urgent measures to support 
business solvency and the energy sector, and in the field of taxation. (see 
Single Transitory Provision and Fourth Final Provision) 
Single Transitory Provision — temporary regime for the suspension of the 
liberalisation of certain foreign direct investments made by residents of EU 
and EFTA countries
Fourth Final Provision — modifies the article 7 bis of the Law 19/2003, of 
July 4, on legal regime of movements of capital and economic transactions 
abroad and on certain measures for prevention of money laundering
Law 3/2013, creating the National Commission on Markets and Competition
Law 9/2014 on Telecommunications
We can see that several member states, already before the enactment of the Regu-
lation, had legislation related to the screening of foreign investments, meaning that 
to a certain extent these countries considered some foreign direct investments as 
threat to their national security.
Operative provisions of the Regulation emphasize that it only provides a frame-
work, and member states can individually decide on the need for screening foreign 
investments.16
The Regulation also defines several terms, including foreign direct investment17, 
foreign investor18 and screening19. These definitions are clear; however, two things 
might be pointed out. Firstly, that the Regulation does not cover portfolio investments. 
This can be underpinned also by the Opinion of the European Court of Justice, which 
states that “The use, by the framers of the FEU Treaty, of the words ‘foreign direct 
investment’ in Article 207(1) TFEU is an unequivocal expression of their intention not 
to include other foreign investment in the common commercial policy. Accordingly, 
commitments vis-à-vis a third State relating to other foreign investment do not fall 
 16 Regulation, Art. 1.
 17 Investment “means an investment of any kind by a foreign investor aiming to establish or to maintain lasting 
and direct links between the foreign investor and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the 
capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity in a Member State, including investments 
which enable effective participation in the management or control of a company carrying out an economic 
activity.”
 18 Foreign investor “means a natural person of a third country or an undertaking of a third country, intending to 
make or having made a foreign direct investment.”
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within the exclusive competence of the European Union pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) 
TFEU.”20 Secondly, that foreign investors are investors from third, non-European 
Union countries.21 However, the most “problematic” issues, such as “security” and 
“public order” are not defined, it being left to the member states and their legal sys-
tems to define these terms.22 This might result in significant differences, as “security” 
is usually a political issue.23 The new (provisional/transitional because of the pan-
demic) Hungarian law on screening (Act No. LVIII of 2020) for example introduces 
the term “state interest” and defines it as public interest related to the security and 
operability of networks and equipment, and to the continuity of supply, not regulated 
by sectoral European Union and national law.24
Generally, member states are free to set up their screening mechanisms, howev-
er, there are some basic principles (or safeguards for foreign investors), enumerated 
in Article 3 that should be respected. For example, rules and procedures should be 
transparent, and they should not discriminate between third countries. Timeframes 
and specific circumstances triggering screening, grounds for screening and detailed 
procedural rules should also be specified in national screening regulations.25 
In addition, the Regulation emphasizes the importance of protecting confidential 
information obtained by the member state carrying out the screening.26 Data protec-
tion is also mentioned in Article 10, which places a similar obligation on the Com-
mission, and in Article 14, which deals with processing of personal data obtained in 
relation to investment screening.
The Regulation provides that screening mechanisms should be such as to allow 
member states to take into account the comments of other member states and the 
opinion of the Commission. However, as we are going to see, examining the three 
mechanisms set up by the Regulation, member states should only “give due con-
sideration to the comments and opinions.” Only under the third mechanism, when 
 20 Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court) 16 May 2017 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=C
ELEX%3A62015CV0002%2801%29> accessed 3 August 2020.
 21 Carlos Esplugues, ‘Towards a Common Screening System of Foreign Direct Investment on National Inter-
est Grounds in the European Union’ (2018) 11(2) Culture, Media and Entertainment Law 4 (doi: 10.20995/
cmel.12.1.1).
 22 “Member States are still, in principle, free to determine the requirements of public policy and public secu-
rity in the light of their national needs, those grounds must, in the Community context and, in particular, as 
derogations from the fundamental principle of free movement of capital, be interpreted strictly, so that their 
scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community insti-
tutions” (ECJ C-54/99, para. 17 <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=3E13A6FF08D23C547
CA3469305560C61?text=&docid=45038&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&c
id=14074965> accessed 8 August 2020). Esplugues concludes based on the case law of the European Court 
of Justice, that public policy and public security may be relied on, only if there is a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. Moreover, those derogations must not be misapplied so 
as, in fact, to serve purely economic ends. Ibid. 14.
 23 Zwartkruis and de Jong agrees that it is difficult to define security. See Zwartkruis, Wolf and de Jong, Bas J., 
‘The EU Regulation on Screening of Foreign Direct Investment: A Game Changer?’ (2019) European Busi-
ness Law Review 3 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428247> accessed 28 July 2020.
 24 Law no. LVIII of 2020, sec. 276 (1).
 25 Regulation, Art. 3 (2).












the foreign investment is likely to affect projects or programs of Union interest,27 the 
member state (target of the investment) is obliged to give explanation to the Com-
mission if it does not follow its opinion.28
An important procedural principle laid down by the Regulation is that member 
states should ensure the possibility of recourse against screening decisions.29 For 
example, in Hungary prohibiting decisions can be challenged in front of the Buda-
pest High Court in a non-contentious proceeding.30 However, viewed from practical 
aspect, if screening decisions are subject to court review, the whole procedure may 
take long time, and it is not efficient for the investor.
There is also a provision that obliges member states to maintain the laws rela-
ted to screening thus preventing circumvention of the screening mechanisms and 
screening decisions.31
2. Factors that should be taken into consideration
Article 4 enumerates factors that should be taken into consideration when exam-
ining a foreign direct investment’s effect on security or public order by member states 
or the Commission. So, it should not be forgotten that the ground for screening is 
the effect of the investment on the security or public policy of the member state, 
and cannot be for example the investment’s effect on its economy.32 There are two 
groups of factors. The first contains the list of so-called sensitive sectors. There are 
five categories, however, though this is not a closed list, and member states may 
expand it. First of all, these are critical infrastructures (like energy, transport, water, 
health, communications, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, defence, 
electoral or financial infrastructure) and sensitive facilities, as well as land and real 
estate crucial for the use of such infrastructure. A good example of critical transport 
infrastructure being invested into by a foreign power is the case of the Piraeus Port 
or Harbor in Greece, the majority of which was bought up by one of China’s premier 
shipping firms, Cosco, in 2016, followed by a 660 million USD investment in 2019. 
The Piraeus Harbor is a major hub of sea-based transportation and general ship-
ping.33 
The next category covers critical technologies and dual use items (artificial intel-
ligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defence, energy stor-
 27 For the broad concept of ‘Union interest’, see Balázs Horváthy, ‘The concept of ‘Union interest’ in EU ex-
ternal trade law’ (2014) 55(3) Acta Juridica Hungarica 261–276. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2587705> accessed 28 July 2020 (doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2587705).
 28 See infra Part 3.
 29 Regulation, Art. 3 (5).
 30 Act No. LVIII of 2020, sec. 285 (1).
 31 Regulation, Art. 3 (6).
 32 Zwartkruis and de Jong (n 23) 16; Esplugues (n 21).
 33 Silvia Amaro, ‘China bought most of Greece’s main port and now it wants to make it the biggest in Europe’ 
CNBC (15 November 2019) <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/15/china-wants-to-turn-greece-piraeus-port-
into-europe-biggest.html> accessed 5 August 2020.
19
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age, quantum and nuclear technologies, nanotechnologies and biotechnologies). 
These are primarily important to keep the European Union economy competitive 
in the global market. A well-known example in this field involves China once again: 
in 2016, one of the largest German robotics companies, KUKA, was subjected to a 
hostile takeover by a Chinese appliance making company called Midea. It should be 
noted that at the time, the German government approved of the transaction.34 Since 
then, despite general guarantees about maintaining staff numbers and German op-
erations, the now-Chinese controlled KUKA experienced significant downturns in 
share price, a reduction in revenue forecasts, and faces an uncertain future.35
Other sensitive sectors are the supply of critical inputs (among others, energy, raw 
materials, food). A French example of this is that the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC) acquired a 30% stake in ENGIE,36 a company that serves as a primary player 
in the supply of thermal, renewable and other energy within Europe (and also plays a 
crucial role in infrastructure, especially in the field of natural gas, where it is claimed 
to be the number one company participating in its transport and storage).37 In a simi-
lar fashion, the UK actually delayed the building of a nuclear power plant because of 
security concerns over a 30% Chinese stake in the project.38
The fourth is access to sensitive information (like personal data, etc.). Though, 
member states have not yet formally instigated proceedings against the application 
at the time of writing and it is only an ‘indirect’ example, the popular social media 
application known as TikTok came under fire recently for allegedly being a tool of 
Chinese governmental spying, essentially alleged to be a tool for China to harvest 
personal data on a global scale, through the murky relationship between TikTok’s 
parent company and the Chinese government, as well as a recent Chinese Law that 
mandated corporate cooperation in intelligence operations. Already, Japan and the 
United States have taken steps against the application, and a European reaction 
also seems highly probable.39
And finally, freedom and pluralism of the media.40 These are important to ensure 
the stability of supply of the industry, and also for political stability of the member 
 34 ‘Berlin approves Kuka sale to Midea’ (DW, 17 August 2016) <https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-approves-kuka-
sale-to-midea/a-19479483> accessed 5 August 2020.
 35 Nik Martin, ‘German robot maker Kuka’s CEO to be replaced by Chinese owners’ DW (24 November 2018) 
<https://www.dw.com/en/german-robot-maker-kukas-ceo-to-be-replaced-by-chinese-owners/a-46440242> 
accessed 5 August 2020.
 36 ‘ENGIE and China Investment Corporation (CIC) signed MOU’ ENGIE (30 June 2015) <https://www.engie.
com/en/journalists/press-releases/engie-china-investment-corporation-signed-mou> accessed 5 August 2020.
 37 ‘Thermal electricity’ (ENGIE) <https://www.engie.com/en/activities/thermal-energy/thermal-power-stations> 
accessed 5 August 2020; ‘Transportation’ (ENGIE) <https://www.engie.com/en/activities/infrastructures/trans-
portation> accessed 5 August 2020.
 38 ‘Hinkley Point C to Go Ahead After EDF Board Approves Project’ (The Guardian, 28 July 2016) <https://www.
theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/28/hinkley-point-c-to-go-ahead-after-edf-board-approves-project, https://
www.china-briefing.com/news/chinese-fdi-eu-top-4-economies> accessed 5 August 2020.
 39 Rebecca Jennings, ‘What’s going on with TikTok, China, and the US government?’ Vox (16 December 2019) 
<https://www.vox.com/open-sourced/2019/12/16/21013048/tiktok-china-national-security-investigation> ac-
cessed 5 August 2020.












states. A good example of this was when in 2015 the Chinese energy company 
CEFC invested into the Czech media company, Empresa Media, which controlled a 
number of publications. Most concerningly, according to the allegations, these publi-
cations all switched to a strongly pro-China narrative since this investment.41
As already mentioned, the above list is not closed. Thus, for example the new 
(provisional/transitional) Hungarian law on screening (Act No. LVIII of 2020) and its 
executive Decree42 in its annex adds several new sectors to those enumerated in Act 
LVII of 2018 on Controlling Foreign Investments Violating Hungary’s Security Inter-
ests, which include, among others, retail trade and quartering and catering in tour-
ism. It is doubtful whether investment into these sectors can seriously affect public 
security or public order of a country. In addition, if too many sectors are covered by 
screening, investors might lose interest in investing in the given economy.
The second group contains those factors which should be taken into consider-
ation when it comes to the assessment of the foreign investor. First of all, it should 
be taken into consideration whether the foreign investor is controlled (or funded) by 
a government. The relevance of this factor was increased following the 2008 global 
economic crisis, after which China has intensified its investments globally, which 
also raised awareness of the matter in Brussels. In particular, China has become 
very interested in investing in European infrastructure companies, obtaining various 
degrees of control over vital installations such as the already mentioned Piraeus 
Harbor in Greece. Additionally, they also began going after European technology 
and brands. This was in part eased by the lack of geopolitical struggle between the 
European Union and China at the time (in contrast to United States-China relations), 
and in part encouraged directly by the Chinese Government, which sought to invest 
the country’s capital outside its borders in its new economic policy.43 With regards 
to the coronavirus crisis, China has once more opted to intensify investment efforts 
in Europe, this time presenting itself as a rational business partner ready to assist 
Europe in its economic recovery from the crisis. However, in contrast to the 2008 
crisis, the European Union seemed to have learned some lessons with regards to 
protecting its strategic assets, as evidenced by the European Union regulation that 
is the subject of this study.44
Another aspect is whether the investor has been involved earlier in activities af-
fecting security of public order in a member state, or if there is a serious risk that 
the foreign investor engages in illegal or criminal activities.45 Neither the first nor the 
second group of factors is a closed list.
 41 Ivana Karásková, ‘How China Influences Media in Central and Eastern Europe’ The Diplomat (19 November 
2019) <https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/how-china-influences-media-in-central-and-eastern-europe> ac-
cessed 5 August 2020.
 42 Government Decree 289/2020 (VI. 17.) defining the measures required for the economic protection of com-
panies having their seats in Hungary.
 43 Philippe Le Corre, Alain Sepulchre ‘Chinese investors can’t get enough of Europe’ (Brookings, 10 May 2016) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinese-investors-cant-get-enough-of-europe> accessed 10 August 2020.
 44 Liisi Karindi, ‘How China is buying influence in Europe’ Chinaobserver (7 July 2020) <https://chinaobservers.
eu/how-china-is-buying-influence-in-europe> accessed 10 August 2020.
 45 Regulation, Art. 4 (2).
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3. Cooperation mechanisms
The most important part of the Regulation deals with cooperation mechanisms. 
Three cases are regulated: firstly, when there is a foreign direct investment into a 
member state and it is undergoing screening; secondly, when there is a foreign direct 
investment into a member state and it is not undergoing screening; and the thirdly, 
when there is a foreign direct investment into a member state which is likely to affect 
projects or programs in the Union’s interest.
Regarding the first mechanism, Article 6(1) of the Regulation requires member 
states to notify the Commission and other member states of any foreign direct invest-
ment in their territory that is undergoing screening. Such notification should contain 
information provided by Article 9(2) of the Regulation: (a) the ownership structure of 
the foreign investor and of the undertaking in which the foreign direct investment is 
planned or has been completed, including information on the ultimate investor and 
participation in the capital; (b) the approximate value of the foreign direct invest-
ment; (c) the products, services and business operations of the foreign investor and 
of the undertaking in which the foreign direct investment is planned or has been 
completed; (d) the member states in which the foreign investor and the undertaking 
in which the foreign direct investment is planned or has been completed conduct 
relevant business operations; (e) the funding of the investment and its source, on 
the basis of the best information available to the member state; (f) the date when the 
foreign direct investment is planned to be completed or has been completed. The 
notification should also touch on the issue of whether the investment is likely to fall 
within the scope of the merger regulation. Based on the notification, other member 
states may issue comments, and the Commission may issue opinions on the invest-
ment in question addressed to the member state undertaking the screening.46 The 
member state concerned may also request the Commission to issue an opinion or 
other member states to provide comments, however, in practice this is unlikely to 
happen.47 The Regulation sets deadlines for the Commission and other member 
states: they should notify the member state undertaking the screening if they want 
to provide opinions or comments within 15 days following the receipt of the infor-
mation on screening. They can also ask for additional information. However, they 
should send their opinion or comments within 35 days following the receipt of the 
information on screening.48 The Regulation states that the member state undertaking 
screening ‘should give due consideration’ to the opinion and comments, but in any 
case, it is entitled to make the final decision on the investment.49
The second mechanism concerns foreign direct investments into member states 
which are not screened. According to Article 7 (1) of the Regulation where a member 
 46 Regulation, Art. 6 (1) and (3).
 47 Regulation, Art. 6 (4).
 48 Regulation, Art. 6 (6) (7).
 49 Regulation, Art. 6 (9). There is even a provision (Art. 6 (8)) which states that in the exceptional case where the 
member state undertaking the screening considers that its security or public order requires immediate action 
it can decide on the investment before the expiry of the deadline, however it should notify the Commission 












state considers that a foreign direct investment planned or completed in another 
member state which is not undergoing screening in that member state is likely to af-
fect its security or public order, or has relevant information in relation to that foreign 
direct investment, it may provide comments to that other member state, at the same 
time sending those comments to the Commission. The Commission is also autho-
rized to issue opinions regarding a foreign direct investment if it considers that it is 
likely to affect security or public order in more than one member state or has relevant 
information in relation to that foreign direct investment. If at least one third of mem-
ber states consider that a foreign direct investment is likely to affect their security or 
public order, the Commission is obliged to issue such an opinion.50 Regarding the 
opinion of the Commission or comments of other member states, there is the same 
language used as for the first mechanism, that is to say, ‘due consideration’ should 
be given to it by the member state where the foreign investment is planned or has 
been completed.51
The third case is where the Commission considers that a foreign direct invest-
ment is likely to affect projects or programs of Union interest on grounds of security 
or public order. In such a case, the Commission may issue an opinion addressed to 
the member state where the foreign direct investment is planned or has been com-
pleted. The member state concerned should take into account the Commission’s 
opinion. If it does not follow it, it should give an explanation to the Commission.52
It can be said that for successful practical application of the Regulation, Article 11 
is a key provision. It provides that communication between the member states and 
the member states and the Commission should be done through so-called contact 
points established by the parties and placed within their respective administration.53 
This assures direct cooperation and communication. However, it is questionable 
whether member states will be honestly willing to provide data and to cooperate in a 
sensitive area like national security.
Transparency and publicity of screening processes is also ensured by the Regula-
tion. There is a requirement of annual reporting by the member states to the Com-
mission. This also applies to member states which have no screening mechanisms. 
Based on this information, the Commission reports to the European Parliament and 
the Council. This report is made public.54
4. Group of experts
The Regulation deals also briefly with the so-called group of experts which was 
set up by a Commission Decision in 2017.55 The group is composed of representa-
 50 Regulation, Art. 7 (2).
 51 Regulation, Art. 7 (7).
 52 Regulation, Art. 8 (1) and (2) (c).
 53 Regulation, Art. 11.
 54 Regulation, Art. 5.
 55 Commission Decision of 29.11.2017 C(2017) 7866 <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.
cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=36097&no=1> accessed 4 August 2020.
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tives of member states’ competent authorities. The group’s task is to provide the Com-
mission with advice and expertise on matters relating to foreign direct investments 
into the European Union. This includes, among others, identifying assets that have 
strategic implications from a security, public order and/or control of critical assets 
and technologies point of view at national level, cross-border level; exchanging infor-
mation and analysis on foreign direct investments, including motives for investment, 
geographic origin and sources of financing (public or private); discussing issues of 
common concern, share best practices and so on. The group shall act at the request 
of the Directorate-General for Trade.
5. Conclusions
Coordination provided by the Regulation is the first step towards harmonization 
of screening foreign investments in the European Union. However, there are several 
problems the Union will have to face if it wants to achieve a well-functioning and ef-
ficient system. As already mentioned in the introduction, foreign direct investment is 
part of common commercial policy, with the Union having exclusive competence in 
this field. However, if the foreign direct investment affects national security, it should 
be screened by the member state’s authorities, and the only tool of the Union to 
influence it is to provide an opinion. Therefore, it is questionable if the Regulation 
is setting up an efficient system, as the only tool in the hands of the Commission is 
political pressure. In addition, lot of member countries still did not realize the impor-
tance of screening, and they have no comprehensive regulation on the screening of 
foreign direct investments.56
The biggest obstacle to achieving a well-functioning and well-coordinated screen-
ing system in the Union is the large number of member states and their different 
interests. The largest member states like Germany, France and Italy are those which 
try to stop the spread of Chinese influence in Europe. They have realized that it is not 
only about protecting their technology and knowledge, but also about political influ-
ence. Some analysts even argue that China’s strategy in Europe is ‘divide and rule’. 
And even these countries are not in full accord. For some of them, like Germany, a 
huge exporter to China, which thus wants to keep good relations with the East Asian 
country, investment screening is part of their China policy, and they are not willing to 
give it up. At the same time, as a dominant economy in the European Union, it wants 
to protect it from Chinese influence.
Some of the smaller member states, like Greece or Portugal, do not really support 
this kind of mechanism, because they became more reliant on foreign investments 
following the economic crisis of 2008. In addition, some of them claim that screening 
might provoke a trade war with economic rivals of the Union.
 56 There might be other sectoral screening rules in other legislation, like merger, energy sector or pharmaceuti-
cal sector which allows member states to protect legitimate interests such as public security, plurality of the 












It is beyond question that the Regulation has some benefits for the European 
Union. It might also encourage member states to better utilize their screening mech-
anisms or to put one into place. In addition, the new system takes into consideration 
not only the interests of the member state where the investment enters, but also 
other member states’ and the Union’s interest. Even in member states where there is 
no formal screening mechanism there could be a certain level of scrutiny. However, 
it should be emphasized again that no member state is obliged to conduct a foreign 
direct investment screening. 
Foreign capital is still crucial for every modern economy, especially in hard times. 
Therefore, the question arises: what will be the result of protectionism in the field of 
investment law in the European Union? Although some of the regulations in member 
states are only temporary, if similar pandemics become more frequent, it is possible 
that the temporary restrictions in national states throughout the European Union 
will become entrenched, maybe extended towards other European Union members 
(Europe’s lack of unity during the first wave of the pandemic was worrying). A further 
issue might be that without foreign competition, the monopoly of domestic corpora-
tions and corruption in national economies can become enhanced.
The real solution could be a supranational screening system. There are more 
and more issues that can affect overall European Union security and public order. 
With Brexit, there is a chance that the integration of member states will get stronger, 
and the Union will take over more and more competencies from them. This process 
might be also accelerated by growing competition and protectionism among global 
powers.
